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Abstract 
Notions of psychological frailty have been evident in comments by journalists, politicians 
and others on public responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. In particular, there is the argument 
that collective selfishness, thoughtless behaviour, and over-reaction would make the effects 
of Covid-19 much worse. The same kinds of claims have been made previously in relation to 
other kinds of emergencies, such as fires, earthquakes and sinking ships. We argue that in 
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these cases as well as in the case of the Covid-19 pandemic, other factors are better 
explanations for fatalities -- namely under-reaction to threat, systemic factors, and 
mismanagement. Psychologizing disasters serves to distract from the real causes and thus 
from who might be held responsible. Far from being the problem, collective psychology in 
emergencies – including the solidarity and cooperation so commonly witnessed among 
survivors – is the solution, one that should be harnessed more effectively in policy and 
practice. 
 
Introduction 
Notions of psychological frailty -- weaknesses of reason or weaknesses of morality -- have 
been evident in many of the comments on public responses to the Covid-19 crisis. Some of 
these have informed policy. For example, part of the reason for delay in introducing stricter 
distancing measures in the UK was the authorities’ assumption that the public would soon 
‘fatigue’ and stop observing them.1 As ever, though, such frailty is said to be magnified by 
the collective. Thus, back in the early days of Covid-19, many commentators argued that 
collective ‘panic’ would potentially be more disastrous than the pandemic itself, through its 
effects on markets, availability of goods,2 relations between different groups,3 and crime.4 
‘Panic’ – meaning selfish, thoughtless behaviour and over-reaction - was said to be as 
‘contagious’ as the virus itself.5 Such collective psychology would therefore turn an 
emergency into a disaster. 
 
1 https://mindhacks.com/2020/03/20/do-we-suffer-behavioural-fatigue-for-pandemic-prevention-measures/ 
2 https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-03-11/panic-covid-19-worse-for-everyone 
3 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/27/coronavirus-panic-uk-hostile-environment-east-
asians 
4 https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-medic-warns-mass-panic-could-prove-worse-than-disease-2020-
3?r=US&IR=T 
5 https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2020/02/21/robert-peckham-covid-19-outbreak-need-strategies-manage-panic-
epidemics/ 
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But is this really the case? Exactly the same claim about the role of public ‘panic’ has 
historically been made in relation to many other kinds of emergencies, including fires, 
terrorist attacks, sinking ships, and crowd crushes. Was it really selfishness, over-reaction, 
and general bad behaviour that caused so many deaths in these cases? Or was it something 
else? 
Take the sinking of the M/V Estonia in 1994, for example. Over 800 people died. Prima 
facie, the greater survival rates of men over women and crew over passengers might suggest 
that the strongest individuals selfishly neglected others in order to save themselves. But 
analysis of the survivorship records and eyewitness testimonies illustrate the danger of 
psychologizing physical constraints (Cornwell et al., 2001). The extreme listing of the ship 
was very sudden. There were attempts among passengers to help each other, but most didn’t 
have the strength to get to the exits themselves, let alone assist others.  
Examining the evidence in emergencies suggests three main reasons why there are 
avoidable fatalities: (1) under-reaction to threat, (2) systemic factors, and (3) 
mismanagement. Here, we briefly describe these alternative explanations for deaths in 
disasters. We then examine how far they help us understand what has happened in the case of 
Covid-19 in the UK context, before discussing the real collective psychology of emergencies. 
Why did they die?  
Rather than over-reaction, the first factor that turns an emergency into a disaster is under-
reaction. People often underestimate risk and disregard possible signals of danger (Tierney, 
Lindell, & Perry, 2001). During 9/11, people inside the World Trade Center who saw objects 
falling from the sky outside didn’t initially recognize these as pieces of the plane that had 
struck their building. Slowness to comprehend the threat means delay in attempts to escape. 
Some people even took time to close down their computers before they sought to leave the 
building.  
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The second reason for deaths in emergencies is systemic. Disasters do not affect 
everyone in the same way; those already disadvantaged suffer disproportionately.6 In the 
Grenfell Tower fire -- the worst fire in the UK since the second world war -- neglect and 
cost-saving by the authorities and manufacturers were behind the fatal decision to clad the 
block in flammable material. Poorer sections of society also have fewer resources to help 
them cope when disaster strikes and less power to demand adequate aftercare.  
A third reason why emergencies often end so badly is mismanagement. The Cocoanut 
Grove nightclub fire of 1942, in which 492 people died, has been presented in psychology 
textbooks as an embodiment of the received wisdom that ‘most deaths in night-club fires are 
due to crowd panic’. Chertkoff and Kushigian’s (1999) detailed re-analysis of events suggests 
instead failure of management of two types. First there was mismanagement of space. The 
emergency exit door was locked. The windows were also nailed shut to prevent people 
leaving without paying their tab. Second there were failures of communication. There were 
no exit signs or training in emergency evacuation, so when staff tried to help lead survivors 
out they could not find the fire exit. In the official investigation, the major causes of the loss 
of life were said to be the locked doors, the unfamiliarity and inaccessibility of normal exits, 
and the jamming of the revolving door. There was no implication that crowd behaviour 
caused the deaths. The management were subsequently prosecuted for manslaughter and 
neglect of building laws.  
A similar story of mismanagement of space can be found in the literature on fatal crowd 
crushes (sometimes -- usually erroneously -- called ‘stampedes’). ‘Panic’ explanations once 
dominated, but a recent systematic review cites as the most common causes of fatalities not 
collective psychology but overcrowding, closure of exits, congestion at bottlenecks, 
deficiencies in safety barriers, and lack of coordination with local authorities (de Almeida & 
 
6 https://www.preventionweb.net/risk/poverty-inequality 
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von Schreeb, 2019). Notoriously, the fatal crush at Hillsborough in 1989 was initially 
explained by some in terms of the disorderly behaviour of fans. But it was later demonstrated 
that disproportionate concern among authorities with preventing football hooliganism led to 
neglect of crowd safety -- including the disastrous decision to let fans into an already 
overcrowded terrace.7 In short, Hillsborough, like Cocoanut Grove, did not happen because 
of failings at the level of collective psychology. 
In relation to failures of communication, changes to information and communication 
practices have often improved safety and saved lives. When the World Trade Center was 
subject to a terrorist attack in 1993, the evacuation was relatively slow (Aguirre, Wenger, & 
Vigo, 1998). Subsequently, regular drills were introduced so that people became familiar 
with the locations of emergency exits. This measure helped make the 9/11 evacuation so 
successful.8 In the case of mass casualty decontamination following a chemical incident, 
failure of responders to communicate effectively has led to reduced public compliance with 
the procedure, increasing risk of fatalities (Carter et al., 2015). The solution has been to train 
responders with the skills to communicate to the public both why decontamination is needed 
and how to carry it out (Drury et al., 2019).  
Under-reaction, system, and mismanagement in the Covid-19 response in the UK 
Unlike fires, earthquakes, floods, and bombings, which tend to be short-term events which 
occur in one place, the effects of the current pandemic are dispersed in time and space. Yet 
like these other emergencies, there is a mortal threat which creates collective fear. And when 
we examine some of the major problems in response and outcomes9 in the Covid-19 crisis, 
 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/apr/26/hillsborough-disaster-deadly-mistakes-and-lies-that-lasted-
decades 
8 
http://www.cfaa.ca/Files/flash/EDUC/FIRE%20ALARM%20ARTICLES%20AND%20RESEARCH/A%20Co
mparison%20of%20the%201993%20and%202001%20evacuations%20of%20the%20World%20Trade%20Cent
er%20nrcc46005.pdf  
9 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-52261859 
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prima facie our three-fold classification above fits better than explanations in terms of public 
selfishness, thoughtlessness, and over-reaction.  
First, under-reaction: while some members of the public have not taken the pandemic 
seriously, the UK data shows that the vast majority adhered to the social distancing and ‘stay 
at home’ regulations.10 Yet there is evidence of highly consequential political under-reaction. 
In the UK, a criticism has been that that the government did not prepare or respond in time.11 
Importantly, the official advice on social distancing was only given on 16th March 2020, and 
the instruction to ‘stay at home’ only on the 23rd. The result of this under-reaction is a death 
rate proportionately higher than most other countries - with over 30,000 hospital and 
community deaths recorded by 12 May 2020 (Scally, Jacobson, & Abbasi, 2020). 
Some of this failure to prepare in time may be straightforward mismanagement. But 
some of it may also be due to under-estimating risk by those in authority. The World Health 
Organization warned about the risk of human-to-human transmission of Covid-19 as early as 
10th January 2020, and urged precautions. The first Department of Health and Social Care 
press release on Covid-19, on 22nd January, stated that the risk to the UK population was 
‘low’.12 Two days later, the Lancet published the first article showing evidence that Covid-19 
was transmittable to humans; the authors recommended careful surveillance, rigorous testing, 
respirators and greater use of personal protective equipment.13 But on the same day, the UK 
Chief Medical Officer still maintained that the risk to the UK public was low. The first 
documented transmission within the UK (as opposed to from travellers from abroad) 
appeared on 28th February. Yet the UK risk level wasn’t raised to ‘high’ till 12th March. 
 
10 https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-trips-to-the-shops-fall-by-85-since-outbreak-according-to-google-
data-11968171 
11 https://archive.is/20200418182037/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/coronavirus-38-days-when-
britain-sleepwalked-into-disaster-hq3b9tlgh 
12 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dhsc-and-phe-statement-on-coronavirus 
13 https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30183-5/fulltext  
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In relation to our second factor, one example where systemic factors were evident but a 
discourse of public bad behaviour was mobilized was in the case of so-called ‘panic 
buying’.14 The rapid emptying of supermarket shelves was an effect of the vulnerability of 
just-in-time supply chains to just a small uptick in consumer spending; and purchasing 
evidence suggests that, in fact, only a small proportion of the population was stockpiling in 
response to the expectations of ‘lockdown’ and shortages.15 Nevertheless government 
ministers chided some of the public for their ‘selfishness’, psychologizing the problem. This 
representation of the public as selfish is highly consequential. Where others in the community 
are seen as competitors, this can create the very individualism that is being condemned, 
undermining the sense of collectivity needed in these times (van Bavel et al., 2020). 
Systemic factors have been crucial in another sense. Poorer and less powerful sections of 
society had fewer choices about how to behave during the first phase of lockdown. Despite 
media campaigns to vilify some people as selfish and thoughtless ‘covidiots’, the evidence on 
reasons for non-adherence shows that much of it was practical rather than psychological. 
Many people had to cram into Tube trains to go to work because they needed money to 
survive and government support schemes were insufficient. People were told they could go 
out to exercise, but those in urban areas had limited public space. And some employers failed 
to provide the support for social distancing and hygiene.16 Those with less income and wealth 
also live in more crowded homes.17  
 
14 The use of the term ‘panic’ in this case illustrates why it is seen as an unhelpful concept by disaster 
researchers (Chertkoff & Kushigian, 1999); the judgement about whether an behaviour is an overreaction is 
either subjective since criteria are unclear (how much shopping does one really need?) or post hoc (and 
therefore not explanatory). 
15 https://www.warc.com/newsandopinion/opinion/why-stockpiling-is-not-the-crazy-selfish-behaviour-that-it-
seems/3483 
16 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52243179 
17 https://www.citylab.com/equity/2020/04/coronavirus-spread-map-city-urban-density-suburbs-rural-
data/609394/ 
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The outcomes of these systematic inequalities are predictable: poorer people have 
repeatedly been shown to be more vulnerable to infection and more likely to die.18 These 
inequalities have persisted into the second phase of lockdown (from May 2020), with lower 
income people being less able to work from home and more likely to be in jobs that bring 
them into contact with others. 
Finally, there is evidence of a specific mismanagement in the form of failure of 
communication. In the UK response, one thing we observed to have changed (and which 
might therefore indicate recognition of an earlier error), was the way the public were 
addressed in the official messaging. Initial government communications stressed the risk to 
oneself as an individual. For example: 
As per the current advice, the most important thing individuals can do to protect 
themselves remains washing their hands more often, for at least 20 seconds, with soap 
and water.19 (emphasis added) 
The message some people therefore picked up from this was about the risk to themselves 
personally. Such individual-focused messaging can lead people to discount the risk, 
especially if they consider themselves young and healthy.20 Later, there was a shift to the 
rationale being to ‘protect the NHS’, ‘protect others’, and a change from ‘you the potential 
victim’ to ‘you the spreader’ (e.g., ‘act like you’ve got it’), which seems to have been more 
persuasive.21 
The role of collective psychology 
 
18 https://www.health.org.uk/news-and-comment/news/deaths-from-covid-19-in-the-most-deprived-areas  
19 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/covid-19-government-announces-moving-out-of-contain-phase-and-
into-delay 
20 https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/dont-personalise-collectivise 
21 The UK government’s new slogan – ‘Stay alert’ -- unveiled in early May 2020 abandoned the collectivization 
implicit in the previous successful messaging, with the consequence that ‘only three in ten Brits think that they 
know what the new slogan … is asking them to do’. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-
reports/2020/05/11/brits-split-changes-coronavirus-lockdown-measures  
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This last example makes the point that indeed psychology is heavily involved in the public 
response to Covid-19. However, it is not a psychology of fixed behavioural tendencies, since 
the self and hence ‘self-interest’ (the motivations for and boundaries of concern) varies with 
contextual factors (in this case political leadership, which failed initially to communicate in 
collectivist terms). So, of course psychology matters in what happens in emergencies, but for 
reasons other than inevitable collective selfishness, thoughtlessness, and over-reaction.  
Let’s consider first the conditions under which behaviour is competitive vs cooperative 
in emergencies. There have been many reports of mutual social support by members of the 
public during the Covid-19 crisis.22 Reviews suggest that cooperation among survivors is 
very common in emergencies, and that members of the public save more lives than 
professional responders (Drury et al., 2019). But in some emergencies, people compete, push, 
and even trample each other. What are the conditions for this to occur? Chertkoff and 
Kushigian’s (1999) comparison of different evacuations found that there was more 
competition when exits were narrow and unfamiliar. We also know that people compete more 
and coordinate less in evacuations when they are positioned psychologically as individuals 
rather than as group members. As Mintz (1951) shows, when an evacuating crowd blocks the 
exit this can be explained in terms of the prevalence of individual competition in a collective 
setting (rather than in terms of excessive emotion). In these cases, then, the emergency ends 
badly due to the absence of collective psychology (i.e., lack of coordination and cooperation). 
Cooperating and giving support can also carry risks, which need to be acknowledged. In 
mass evacuations, the larger the group, the slower the egress, because speed is reduced 
through people interacting with each other (Aguirre et al., 1998). And the motivation to give 
support to other survivors can lead some to take risks with their personal safety; so, what is 
 
22 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/03/nhs-coronavirus-crisis-volunteers-frustrated-at-lack-of-
tasks?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other 
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good for the collective in emergency is not always good for particular individuals (Drury, 
Cocking, & Reicher, 2009).23 In the case of Covid 19, the risk to the individual from 
supporting the group is clear where that supportive behaviour involves physical proximity 
(whether delivering food or giving emotional support face-to-face). 
What about public under-reaction – why does this occur? Under-estimation of risk has 
sometimes been characterised as an ‘optimistic bias’ (Kinsey, Gwynne, Kuligowski, & 
Kinateder, 2019). But in a context where emergency events are rare (i.e., most of the time), it 
is a reasonable to assume that ‘it won’t happen to us’. This assumption can reverse when 
emergency events become more common – for example, in 2017 after a spate of terrorist 
attacks in London, hundreds of people in Oxford Street fled from a noise that turned out to be 
harmless. In general, then, the extent to which information concerning a threat is seen as 
plausible is a function of the broad social context of dangers. Expectations of danger are 
raised (and the readiness to flee or take other action is greater) in a context of recent incidents 
relevant to our social group.  
How do perceptions of risk become collective? People respond not only to ‘direct’ 
signals of risk but to other people’s responses to that signal (Bruder, Fischer, & Manstead, 
2014). We suggest that the extent to which the response of others to the possible threat is 
seen as conveying information is dependent on the self-relevance of these others in a 
particular context, which in turn is often a function of shared identity. Based on what we 
know about social influence processes in other contexts (Bruder et al., 2014), in the case of 
Covid-19 it’s plausible to suppose that the sight of others in our community routinely 
observing (or ignoring) social distancing regulations, for example, is likely to send a strong 
 
23 This is one of the main reasons why debates around rationality and irrationality in behaviour in emergencies 
are dead ends.  
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signal to us around the safety of doing the same – particularly where we identify with the 
community or see these exemplars as prototypes.  
Psychological factors can interact with management failures to help explain why some 
emergency events end so badly. Fearing public ‘panic’ leads the authorities to withhold 
information about the emergency (Drury et al., 2019). But lack of information in an 
emergency increases public anxiety. And when the public perceives that information is being 
withheld from them, this damages their relationship with the authority (Carter et al., 2015). 
Consequently, when the authorities do release correct information, the public may mistrust 
and fail to act upon it. In the case of Covid-19, the need to treat the public with respect in 
order to build trust has been part of the advice given by behavioural scientists to the UK 
government.24 
Discussion and conclusions 
We do not deny that in emergencies some people behave selfishly and thoughtlessly or that 
some may over-react. Indeed, as explained, research suggests some of the conditions for 
competition to prevail over cooperation. What we are questioning here is the notion that such 
public reactions are a default or are a major cause of problems in the Covid-19 crisis. The 
existing literature on disasters does not support this view, and prima facie major problems in 
the Covid-19 response and outcomes can be better understood otherwise – in terms of 
(political) under-reaction, systemic issues, and mismanagement. 
Collective ‘panic’ is referred to as a ‘disaster myth’ in the literature on disasters (Drury 
et al., 2019). Rather than a neutral description of how people actually behave, it is best 
understood as part of a particular discourse or cultural representation, one which 
psychologizes -- and indeed pathologizes -- public responses in emergencies and disasters. 
 
24 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873732/07-
role-of-behavioural-science-in-the-coronavirus-outbreak.pdf 
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Given what is known about under-reaction, systemic factors, and mismanagement in 
emergencies, to emphasise instead the role of collective ‘bad behaviour’ has clear ideological 
functions. In naturalizing fatalities, it distracts from the real causes and thus from who might 
be held responsible for mismanagement, instead blaming the victims. The irony, of course, is 
that, far from being the problem, collective psychology in emergencies – the solidarity and 
cooperation so commonly witnessed among community members and strangers -- is usually 
the solution. Collective psychology therefore can and should be harnessed more effectively in 
policy and practice in the Covid-19 response (Elcheroth & Drury, 2020) – through framing 
both the threat and the solution in collective terms, and through emphasizing shared norms 
around collective well-being and safety (Drury et al., 2019). Why do people die in 
emergencies? It’s probably not because of collective psychology. 
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